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Abstract
We study the influence of Unruh effect on quantum Stackelberg duopoly.
We show that the acceleration of noninertial frame strongly effects the
payoffs of the firms. The validation of the subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium is limited to a particular range of acceleration of the noninertial
frame. The benefit of initial state entanglement in the quantum form of
the duopoly in inertial frame is adversely affected by the acceleration. The
duopoly can become as a follower advantage only in a small region of the
acceleration.
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Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent,
self interested agents. It emerged from the work of Von Neumann [1], and is
now used in various disciplines like economics, biology, medical sciences, social
sciences and physics [2, 3]. Due to dramatic development in quantum informa-
tion theory [4], the game theorists [5-9] have made strenuous efforts to extend
the classical game theory into the quantum domain. The first attempt in this
direction was made by Meyer [10] by quantizing a simple coin tossing game.
Applications of quantum games are reviewed by several authors [11, 12]. A
formulation of quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition is
presented by Ichikawa et al. [13].
In quantum games, results different from the classical counterparts are ob-
tained by using the fascinating feature of quantum mechanics ”the entangle-
ment”. Recently, the study of quantum entanglement of various fields has been
extended to the relativistic setup [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] and interesting results
about the behavior of entanglement have been obtained. Alsing et al [14] have
shown that the entanglement between two modes of a free Dirac field is degraded
by the Unruh effect and asymptotically reaches a nonvanishing minimum value
in the infinite acceleration.
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In this letter, we study the influence of Unruh effect on the payoffs function
of the firms in the quantum Stackelberg duopoly. We show that the payoffs
function of the firms are strongly influenced by the acceleration of the noninertial
frame. It is shown that for small values of acceleration the duopoly is leader
advantage and it becomes the follower advantage in the range of large values
of acceleration. Unlike the quantum form of the duopoly in inertial frames,
the benefit of initial state entanglement is adversely affected in the noninertial
frames. We show that for a maximally entangled initial state, the Unruh effect
damps the payoffs considerably as compared to the case of unentangled initial
state. Furthermore, it is shown that the Unruh effect limits the validation of
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome to a particular range of values
of the acceleration of the frame. The payoffs of the firms vanish, irrespective of
the initial state entanglement, at a particular value of the acceleration.
The Stackelberg duopoly is a market game, which is a modified form of the
Cournot duopoly. In the Cournot duopoly, two firms simultaneously put a ho-
mogeneous product into a market and guess that what action the opponent will
take. The Stackelberg duopoly is a dynamic model of duopoly in which one firm,
say firm A, moves first and the other firm, say B, goes after. Before making its
decision, firm B observes the move of firm A. This transforms the static nature
of the Cournot duopoly to a dynamic one. Firm A is usually called the leader
and firm B the follower, on this basis the game is also called the leader-follower
model [20]. In the classical Stackelberg duopoly, it is assumed that firm B will
respond optimally to the strategic decision of firm A. As firm A can precisely
predict firm B’s strategic decision, firm A chooses its move in such a way that
maximizes its own payoff. This informational asymmetry makes the Stackelberg
duopoly as the first mover advantage game. The quantum Stackelberg duopoly
has been studied under various circumstances and interesting results have been
obtained [21, 22, 23, 24]
We consider two firms, A and B, that share an entangled initial state of two
qubits at a point in flat Minkowski spacetime. Then firm B moves with a uni-
form acceleration and firm A stays stationary. Let the two modes of Minkowski
spacetime that correspond to firm A and firm B are, respectively, given by |n〉A
and |n〉B. We assume that the firms share the following entangled initial state
|ψi〉 = cos θ|00〉A,B + sin θ|11〉A,B (1)
where θ is a measure of entanglement. The state is maximally entangled at
θ = pi
4
. The first entry in each ket of Eq. (1) corresponds to firm A and the
second entry corresponds to firm B. From the accelerated firm B’s frame, the
Minkowski vacuum state is found to be a two-mode squeezed state [14]
|0〉M = cos r|0〉I |0〉II + sin r|1〉I |1〉II , (2)
where cos r =
(
e−2piωc/a + 1
)−1/2
. The constant ω, c and a, in the exponential
stand, respectively, for Dirac particle’s frequency, light’s speed in vacuum and
firm B’s acceleration. In Eq. (2) the subscripts I and II of the kets represent
the Rindler modes in region I and II, respectively, in the Rindler spacetime
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Figure 1: Rindler spacetime diagram: A uniformly accelerated observer B (firm
B) moves on a hyperbola with acceleration a in region I and is causally discon-
nected from region II.
diagram (see Fig. (1)). The excited state in Minkowski spacetime is related to
Rindler modes as follow [14]
|1〉M = |1〉I |0〉II . (3)
In terms of Minkowski modes for firm A and Rindler modes for firm B, the
entangled initial state of Eq. (1) by using Eqs. (2) and (3) becomes
|ψ〉A,I,II = cos θ cos r|0〉A|0〉I |0〉II + cos θ sin r|0〉A|1〉I |1〉II + sin θ|1〉A|1〉I |0〉II .
(4)
Since firm B is causally disconnected from region II, we must take trace over
all the modes in region II. This leaves the following density matrix between
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the two firms,
ρA,I =


cos2 r cos2 θ 0 0 cos r cos θ sin θ
0 cos2 θ sin2 r 0 0
0 0 0 0
cos r cos θ sin θ 0 0 sin2 θ

 . (5)
In the quantum Stackelberg duopoly, each firm has two possible strategies I,
the identity operator and C, the inversion operator or Pauli’s bit-flip operator.
Let x and 1−x stand for the probabilities of I and C that firm A applies and y,
1 − y, are the probabilities that firm B applies, respectively. The final density
matrix is given by [25]
ρf = xyIA ⊗ IB ρA,I I
†
A ⊗ I
†
B + x (1− y) IA ⊗ CB ρA,I I
†
A ⊗ C
†
B
+y (1− x)CA ⊗ IB ρA,I C
†
A ⊗ I
†
B
+(1− x) (1− y)CA ⊗ CB ρA,I C
†
A ⊗ C
†
B , (6)
where ρA,I is the density matrix given by Eq. (5).
Suppose that the players’ moves in the quantum Stackelberg duopoly are
given by probabilities lying in the range [0, 1]. In the classical form of the
duopoly, the moves of firms A and B are given by quantities q1 and q2, which
have values in the range [0,∞). We assume that firms A and B agree on a
function that uniquely defines a real positive number in the range (0, 1] for
every quantity q1, q2 in [0,∞). Such a function is given by 1/(1 + qi), so that
firms A and B find x and y, respectively, as
x =
1
1 + q1
, y =
1
1 + q2
(7)
The payoffs of firms A and B are given by the following trace operations
PA (q1, q2) = Tr
[
ρfP
op
A (q1, q2)
]
, PB (q1, q2) = Tr
[
ρfP
op
B (q1, q2)
]
, (8)
where P opA , P
op
B are payoff operators of the firms and are given by
P opA (q1, q2) =
q1
q12
(kρ11 − ρ22 − ρ33) ,
P opB (q1, q2) =
q2
q12
(kρ11 − ρ22 − ρ33) , (9)
where ρii are the diagonal elements of the final density matrix, k is a constant
as given in Ref. [20] and q12 is given by
q12 =
1
(1 + q1) (1 + q2)
. (10)
The backward-induction outcome in the Stackelberg duopoly is found by
first finding the reaction function R2 (q1) of firm B to an arbitrary quantity q1
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chosen by firm A. It is found by differentiating firm B’s payoff with respect to
q2, and maximizing the result for q1 and can be written as
R2 (q1) = maxPB (q1, q2) (11)
Once firm B chooses this quantity, firm A can compute its optimization problem
by differentiating its own payoff with respect to q1 and then maximizing it to
find the value q1 = q
∗
1 . Using the value of q
∗
1 in Eq. (11), we can get the value
of q∗2 . These quantities define the backward-induction outcome of the quantum
Stackelberg duopoly and represent the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The
payoffs of the firms at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be found using
Eq. (8).
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Figure 2: (color online) The payoffs are plotted at the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium against the acceleration r for unentangled initial state. The value
of k is set to 1. The solid line represents the payoff of firm A and the dotted
line represents the Payoff of firm B.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the duopoly becomes
q∗1 =
cos2 θ(k cos2 r − sin2 r)
2(cos2 r cos2 θ + sin2 θ)
q∗2 =
4 cos2 θ(k cos2 r − sin2 r)(cos2 r cos2 θ + sin2 θ)
(3− k + 12 cos 2r + (1 + k) cos 4r) cos4 θ
−8 cos2 θ((−4 + k2) cos2 r + k sin2 r) sin2 θ + 16 sin4 θ
(12)
It is important to note that the result of Eq. (12) for unentangled initial state
(θ = 0) reduces to the classical result when we put the acceleration r = 0.
5
Similarly the results of Ref. [21] for the maximal entangled initial state are
retrieved for θ = pi/4 and r = 0. In the classical form of the duopoly the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is a point, whereas in this case, it is a function of both
entanglement angle θ and the acceleration r of firm B’s frame. The payoffs of
the firms at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for unentangled initial state,
when k = 1, are given as
PA =
1
8
cos2 2r sec2 r
PB =
cos2 r cos 2r
4(3 + cos 2r)
(13)
The payoffs of the firms for a maximally entangled initial state, with k = 1,
become
PA =
cos2 2r
8(3 + cos 2r)
PB =
cos2 2r(3 + cos 2r) sec2 r
32(6 + cos 2r)
(14)
The existence of the Nash equilibrium requires that the firms’ moves (q∗1 and
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Figure 3: (color online) The payoffs are plotted at the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium against the acceleration r for maximally entangled initial state. The
value of k is set to 1. The solid line represents the payoff of firm A and the
dotted line represents the Payoff of firm B.
q∗2) should have positive values. It can easily be checked from Eq. (12) that
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for both unentangled and maximally entangled initial states the move of firm
A becomes negative for r ≥ pi/4. Hence no Nash equilibrium exists for the
values of r at which q∗1 becomes negative. Thus the range of the acceleration
in which the acceleration parameter r is given by pi/4 ≤ r ≤ pi/2 is not a
physically meaningful range for the Stackelberg duoply. To see how the payoffs
are influenced by the acceleration in its physically meaningful range, we plot
it against the acceleration parameter r. In Fig. 2, we show the plot of the
firms’ payoffs against r for the unentangled initial state. It can be seen that
for smaller values of the acceleration, the duopoly is leader advantage and the
payoffs decrease with the increasing value of the acceleration. At r = 0.66 there
happens a critical point at which both firms are equally benefitted. From this
point onward, the payoff of firm A rapidly decreases and becomes zero at r =
0.76. The duopoly becomes follower advantage in the region 0.66 < r < 0.78.
The payoff of the follower firm reaches zero at r = 0.78. The payoffs of the
firms for the maximally entangled initial state are plotted in Fig. 3. It can be
seen that the payoffs of the firms are highly damped as compared to the case
of unentangled initial state and the duopoly is follower advantage for the whole
range of the acceleration in which the Nash equilibrium exists. The payoffs of
both firms becomes zero at r = 0.75. In Fig. 4, we plot the payoffs of the firms
against the entanglement angle θ. It is seen that the payoffs decrease with the
increasing degree of entanglement in the initial state. The duopoly is follower
advantage for smaller value of θ and becomes leader advantage as the degree of
the initial state entanglement increases.
In conclusion, we study the influence of Unruh effect on the payoffs function
of the quantum Stackelberg duopoly. We have shown that the Unruh effect lim-
its the validation of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome to certain
range of acceleration of firm B’s frame. The acceleration damps the payoffs func-
tion both for unentangled and entangled initial states. However, the damping
is heavy when the initial state is maximally entangled and the duopoly always
benefit the firm that moves first. For an unentangled initial state, a critical
point that correspond to a particular value of the acceleration exists at which
both firms are equally benefitted. For larger values of acceleration the duopoly
becomes a follower advantage. We show that irrespective of the degree of entan-
glement in the initial state, the payoffs function vanish when the acceleration of
firm B frame reaches to pi/4.
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Figures Captions
Figure 1. Rindler spacetime diagram: A uniformly accelerated observer firm
B (B) moves on a hyperbola with acceleration a in region I and is causally
disconnected from region II.
Figure 2. (color online) The payoffs are plotted at the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium against the acceleration r for unentangled initial state. The value
of k is set to 1. The solid line represents the payoff of firm A and the dotted
line represents the Payoff of frim B.
Figure 3. (color online) The payoffs are plotted at the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium against the acceleration r for maximally entangled initial state. The
value of k is set to 1. The solid line represents the payoff of firm A and the
dotted line represents the Payoff of frim B.
Figure 4. (color online) The payoffs are plotted at the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium against the entanglement angle θ. The values other parameters are
chosen as k = 1,r = 2pi/9. The solid line represents the payoff of firm A and
the dotted line represents the Payoff of frim B.
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